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This article examines the change in technical (in)efficiency of the Pakistani banking 
industry after the structural reform started in the late 1990s.  With international assistance, 
the Pakistani government has undertaken the restructuring and preparation for 
privatisation of national commercial and development banks, of which the main goal is 
the improvement of the efficiency in financial markets.  Despite the small sample size, 
the estimated stochastic production frontier indicates that employees are statistically 
productive, but capital in terms of branch network is not productive.  This is an example 
counter to the common view that in a less developed banking industry, employees are too 
often idle and are not productive at all.  It is also shown that the efficiency performance 
of the structural adjustment programmes is in marked contrast among banks.  Some banks 
are found to have improved their technical efficiency during the reform period, while the 
efficiency improvement of others was ambiguous.  
 
1.  INTRODUCTION 
The productivity in the banking industry has been of research interest for 
industrial economists, because although the banking sector had traditionally been a 
regulated industry, it became more deregulated in the 1990s.  Thus, by comparing 
the estimated productivity before and after the structural reform including 
deregulation and privatisation, it is possible to empirically examine the reform 
effects.  This type of investigation into bank efficiency is important from the 
viewpoint of macroeconomics as well, since adequate development of financial 
sectors is essential for stabilising the macro-economy and accelerating economic 
growth.   
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There are many previous studies discussing the efficiency and economies of 
scale and scope in the banking industry.  For example, Berger, Leusner, and Mingo 
(1997) investigate the branch efficiency of U.S. large commercial banks from 1989 
to 1991, by separately estimating frontier-flexible and translog cost functions for 
several years.  Their evidence shows that banks are likely to over-branch twice as 
much as the possible cost-minimising level, and technical inefficiency, namely X-
inefficiency, amounts to about 20 percent of their operation costs.  Berger and 
Hannan (1998) also examine the U.S. bank efficiency, concluding that the efficiency 
cost (i.e., X-inefficiency) resulting from a lack of market discipline is much larger 
than the deadweight welfare loss due to misallocation by monopoly power.1   
Battese, Heshmati, and Hjalmarsson (1998) examine the efficiency of labour 
utilisation in the Swedish banking industry, using the stochastic frontier analysis 
(SFA).  Regressing the labour input on the outputs of financial services such as loans, 
guarantees, and deposits, and the quasi-fixed input such as branches, given one-sided 
stochastic inefficiency and idiosyncratic noise, it is found that technical inefficiency 
of the banks in their use of labour is on average 12 percent above the stochastic 
frontier. Further, the technical inefficiency increased immediately after the reform in 
the banking industry in the mid-1980s; it has decreased due to the reform effect since 
1991.   
Adams, Berger and Sickles (1999) perform a stochastic panel distance frontier 
estimation, using the data of over 2500 U.S. banks over 10 years.  The estimation of 
the Cobb-Douglas production functions indicates that technical efficiency scores 
normalised by the most efficient bank are quite small and range from 53.5 percent to 
54.3 percent.   
In this paper, I examine the change in technical (in)efficiency of the Pakistani 
banking industry, where the government has undertaken the restructuring and 
preparation for privatisation of nationalised commercial banks (NCBs) and 
development finance institutions (DFIs) since the late 1990s. Historically, the 
banking industry in Pakistan has been one of the most inefficient sectors due to 
religious and political reasons.  In the Islamic banking system, the exaction of non-
performing loans (NPLs) may be difficult.  Moreover, the Pakistani government has 
owned many public enterprises and large agriculture-based manufacturers, which are 
traditionally short of funds for new investment, operation, and maintenance.  Thus, 
the government’s instruction to finance such state-owned enterprises (SOEs) tended 
to be politically justifiable for securing the basic life of the public, and it seems to 
have been irresistible for the NCBs and DFIs.   
As a result of such discretionary governmental intervention, rather than 
market competition, the Pakistani banking industry has accumulated a considerable 
 
1Moreover, Berger, Saunders, Scalise, and Udell (1998) examine the bank efficiency change, 
focusing on the great number of merger and acquisition (M&A) activities following the U.S. deregulation 
since the late 1970s.  They estimate the impact of such bank M&A on small business lending.   
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amount of NPLs, which approximately amount to a half of the total credit.2  The 
banking industry comes to play only a minor role in financial intermediation services.  
Even innovative business firms cannot have the access to bank finance, and no 
consumers are willing to make a deposit to such inefficient banks.   
This inefficient financial system in Pakistan may be a crucial restriction on its 
economic growth.  As Khan and Senhadji (2000) summarise previous empirical 
studies, there is a statistically significant relationship between economic growth and 
financial development.  Using two macro-variables, GDP per capita as a proxy of 
economic growth and the ratio of domestic credit to GDP as a common indicator for 
financial depth, the relationship in major Asian developing countries is illustrated in 
Figure 1.  It implies that the Pakistani low economic growth is related to (but not 
necessarily caused by) its immature financial system.   
As to the relationship between economic growth and financial development, 
there is no clear historical trend in Pakistan.  Figures 2 and 3 show per capita GDP in 
US dollar and the ratio of domestic credit to GDP.  This may be caused by a 
measurement error that the domestic credit includes non-performing loans.   
Given these situations, the Pakistani government started the macro-economic 
and financial sector restructuring programme under guidance of the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) in 1996.  The World Bank and the Japanese government also 
co-financed the banking sector adjustment loan (BSAL) to support this Pakistani 
government effort, of which the main goal is to improve the efficiency of financial 
institutions through separating ownership and management and strengthening the 
banks’ accountability and the central bank’s monitoring.  It was expected that the 
more efficient financial system would lead to mobilisation of human resources in the 
banking industry, efficient allocation of domestic capital resources, and improvement 
in the access of the poor people to financial services.  All these effects are conducive 
to stable economic growth and poverty reduction.   
The first phase of the programme in 1997-1998 mainly consisted of (i) 
preventing a further increase of bad loans, (ii) recovery of NPLs through the 
“Incentive Scheme,” invented by the State Bank of Pakistan (SBP), (iii) 
retrenchment of surplus staff through the “Golden Handshake Scheme” and closure 
of over-extended branches, (iv) preparation for privatising three NCBs and two DFIs, 
(v) introduction of international accounting standards and strengthening prudential 
regulation, and (vi) establishment of banking courts for enhancement of the solution 
of disputes related to NPLs through legal procedures.  
Furthermore, the World Bank continued to support this structural adjustment 
in the banking sector and approved the second phase credit in October 2001.  The 
second phase programme included (i) restructuring of the cost structure, (ii) 
complete privatisation of partially privatised banks, (iii) liberalisation of bank  
 
2 In the sample of the five major state-owned banks from 1997 to 2001, the ratio of non-
performing loans ranges from 16.7 percent to 87.8 percent. 
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Fig. 1.  Financial Depth and GDP per Capita. 
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Fig. 2.  Time Trend of Financial Depth and Economic Growth in Pakistan. 
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Fig. 3.  Cycle of Economic Growth and Financial Depth. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
branching policy, (iv) facilitation of loan collateral foreclosure to reduce the default 
cost, (v) reform of the National Savings Schemes (NSS) to integrate the financial 
market, (vi) discontinuance of the mandatory placement of foreign currency deposits, 
and (vii) strengthening the central bank to play a more effective role as a regulator of 
the banking sector.3 
Thus, the examination of the recent efficiency improvement in the Pakistani 
banking industry is directly related to the evaluation of the structural adjustment 
programmes.  Recall that the effect of the structural adjustment in the late 1990s on 
financial development and economic growth is difficult to capture on the 
macroeconomic level. (See Figures 2 and 3.)  Instead, in this paper, using the micro-
data of loans, labour and branch network, I examine the effectiveness of the 
programmes by estimating a stochastic production frontier of the banking industry 
over the reform period: 1997 to 2000.  Although the number of observations is 
limited, yet it will be shown that some NCBs are continuously improving technical 
efficiency, while others are not.   
This paper is organised as follows.  In Section 2, I describe the data and 
discuss the definitions of input and output variables of banks.  In Section 3, I present 
an econometric specification based on the standard SFA.  In Section 4, I show the 
estimation results and discuss some implications and potential issues.  
 
3For the details of these programmes, see Press Release, March 20, 1998, published by the 
Overseas Economic Cooperation Fund, Japan (currently Japan Bank of International Cooperation), and 
News Release No. 98/1563SAS by the World Bank.  Also see News Release No. 2002/113/SAS for the 
World Bank’s second phase assistance. 
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2.  DATA AND DEFINITION OF INPUT AND OUTPUT 
I use micro-data on input and output, over the period December 1997 to 
March 2001, of five major state-owned banks: Habib Bank Limited (HBL), United 
Bank Limited (UBL), National Bank of Pakistan (NBP), Industrial Development 
Bank of Pakistan (IDBP), and National Development Finance Corporation (NDFC).4  
These banks are dominating the domestic banking services in Pakistan.  Since the 
main purpose of this paper is to examine the efficiency changes during and after the 
banking sector reform starting from around 1996, I restrict the current analysis to 
these five target banks and to the reform period.   
Of course, this restriction makes for a small sample, but it is not always 
appropriate to increase the sample size, as pointed out by McCloskey and Ziliak 
(1996) and Kennedy (1998).  Although almost any estimates can become significant 
if the sample size is sufficiently large, statistical significance does not imply 
economic significance (i.e., “too-large sample size problem”).  In the current paper, 
this seems to matter.  The banking sector reform in the late 1990s was a historic 
movement in Pakistan, and the current market structure is completely different from 
that before the mid-1990s.  Therefore, I only use the latest data to keep the 
estimation results economically meaningful—and partly address the too-small 
sample problem through the bootstrap method.   
Based on the duality theorem, I estimate a production frontier, instead of cost 
and profit functions [e.g., Diewert (1971)].  Estimating a production function is a 
useful approach to avoid two crucial problems: the input price endogeneity and the 
difficulty of measuring input prices, particularly the rental rates on capital.  The 
second problem is typical and serious in studying the banking sector of developing 
countries, in which the labour and capital markets are not yet developed and are 
likely to be distorted by state intervention.   
In choosing input and output variables, I rely on the production approach, 
where using labour and capital, banks are supposed to produce financial 
intermediation activities [Berger, Leusner and Mingo (1997)].  Banks are clearly 
multi-product firms.  Accordingly, the variety of types of loans and deposits are used 
as outputs in the previous literature; there is no clear consensus about what assets or 
liabilities constitute outputs or inputs in the banking activities [Berger and Humphrey 
(1992); Berger and Hannan (1998); Adams, Berger and Sickles (1999)].   
In this paper, I focus on lending operations.  My focus is motivated by the 
view that in developing countries the most essential policy issue concerns the 
provision of sufficient lending money to growth sectors with an overriding priority to 
rapid industrialisation [Teranishi (1991)].  The mobilisation of domestic financial 
 
4 HBL, UBL, and NBP are grouped in the NCBs, and IDBP and NDFC belong to the DFIs.  The 
State Bank of Pakistan mentions that the DFIs are not functioning on commercial basis but playing 
specially assigned roles, such as financing priority sectors.  Thus, as I shall mention in the econometric 
part, their production function might be different than that of the national commercial banks.   
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resources of households is also necessary but of secondary importance on the low 
levels of economic development, since surplus financial resources per se are 
relatively limited.   
Further, often the developing countries have other systems playing a major 
role in deposit mobilisation.  In Pakistan, in fact, the National Saving Schemes 
(NSS) have been used as an instrument of collecting financial savings; while the 
flows of deposits of scheduled banks collected only 6.4 percent of GDP in 1991, 4.6 
percent in 1997, and 0.9 percent in 2000, the flows of the NSS as percent of GDP 
amounted to 4.2 percent, 11.8 percent, and 13.8 percent, respectively.5  Although it 
has been tried to mitigate the distortion of the NSS by a series of financial reforms, 
the profit rates of the NSS are still more attractive to depositors.  This phenomenon 
may reflect the fact that the trustworthiness of banks is not enough to collect the 
saving money from the public at the earlier stage of financial development.   
Another reason for choosing a simple production function with a single output is 
that the Pakistani financial sectors have started taking off.  The monetary sophistication 
is not yet required so much; the total amount of loans can be considered as a primary 
output measurement of banks.  Therefore, I only treat performing loans, defined by the 
total credit minus NPLs, as an output of the banking sector. 6  It is clear that the total 
credit amount is not appropriate, because it may include non-performing loans.  This 
does really matter in the case of the Pakistani banking industry, where the ratio of 
NPLs reaches more than 50 percent of total credit.7  I avoid this type of measurement 
error by using performing loans rather than the total credit.   
For producing performing loans, I consider labour and capital as two physical 
inputs.  It is natural that the number of employees working for each bank is used as 
an input labour quantity.  On the other hand, the quantity of input capital is difficult 
to measure. 8   In this paper, the capital amount is measured by the number of 
branches for each bank.  This capital proxy seems to be more adequate than other 
accounting measurements of capital, such as book values of tangible assets.  While 
the book values of any capital categories are largely dependent on accounting 
treatments, the number of branches suitably represents the physical network size per 
banks that is actually required for providing loans.   
 
5Source: State Bank of Pakistan (2002a).  
6There are various alternative output and input variables.  According to the State Bank of Pakistan, the 
main activity of employees in the branch network in rural areas is to mobilise deposits, and thus the deposit 
amount may be one of reasonable output measures.  Furthermore, one may consider the amount of newly loaned 
money to be a better output, which may be approximated by differentials of total credit.  However, during the 
structural adjustment period, the total credit is greatly influenced by loan recovery, rather than new loans.  My 
data do not allow for reducing the number of observations by taking the differentials.  Therefore, in this paper, I 
use the gross amount of performing loans, but not new credit, as an output.   
7According to State Bank of Pakistan (2002b), the non-performing loan rates in 1997 were 59.0 
percent for state-owned banks, 2.3 percent for private banks, and 3.1 percent for foreign banks.  For all 
banks, this rate was 64.4 percent.   
8See Berger and Hannan (1998).   
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Table 1 presents the summary statistics of input and output variables.  The 
mean performing loan is 48.2 billion Rupees (Rs).  Individual banks on average 
employ about 11,000 workers and have about 900 branches.  But these figures 
significantly differ from bank to bank, as indicated by their maximum and minimum 
values in the table.  Labour ranges from 510 to 24,000; capital varies with the range 
between 14 and 1,700.   
 
Table 1 
Summary Statistics 
Symbol Definition Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
   Y Performing Loans (Rs Mil.) 48219.1 42141.6 2711.0 112604.0 
   L Employees 11012.2 9040.6 510 23599 
   K Branches 908.4 768.9 14 1748 
Note that performing loans are defined by the total credit minus the amount of non-performing loans. 
 
3.  ECONOMETRICS 
Following Fan, Li, and Weersink (1996), I estimate a simple stochastic 
production frontier for banks, which is statistically sophisticated in the sense that it 
has the two-part-composed-error term: one-sided stochastic error and two-sided 
idiosyncratic error.  That is, the stochastic frontier analysis (SFA) distinguishes a 
non-negative random variable associated with technical inefficiency representing the 
deviation from the efficient production frontier from a random variable generated by 
any statistical errors.  Although my data take the form of a balanced panel, I do not 
use that characteristic in order to save the degree of freedom of the small sample but 
pool the time-variant observations. 9   
Letting the amount of performing loans be Y, and the two physical inputs 
(i.e., employees and branches) be L and K, the production function can be written 
as:  
iiii KLgY ε+= ),(  … … … … … (1) 
For the functional form, I employ a Cobb-Douglas specification and a flexible 
translog function, both of which are commonly used in empirical work:   
iiKiLi KLY ε+β+β+β= lnlnln 0  … … … … (2) 
 
9For the details of the time-variant SFA, see Battese and Coelli (1992); Coelli (1996); Filippini 
(2001) and Battese, Rao, and Walujadi (2001).  In particular, Battese and Coelli (1992) provide a 
complete form of the log-likelihood function to be maximised, and Coelli (1996) proposes a computer 
programme for that maximum likelihood estimation.   
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I here impose the condition for symmetry, i.e., KLLK β=β .  The error term is 
decomposed as follows:   
 uv iii −=ε  … … … … … … (4) 
where iu , which indicates a non-negative technical inefficiency, is assumed to be 
independently and identically distributed (i.i.d.) according to a half-normal 
distribution ),0( uN σ , and iv  is i.i.d. according to a standard normal distribution 
),0( vN σ , representing a statistical error.   
As Weinstein (1964) proves, the probability density function of the sum of 
normal and truncated normal distributions is:   
  for                   f ∞<ε<∞−

 


σ
λεΦ−


σ
εφσ=ε 1
2)(  … … (5) 
where )(⋅φ  and )(⋅Φ  are the normal probability and cumulative density functions 
respectively.  Note that in Equation (5), I re-parameterise 222 vu σ+σ=σ  and 
vu σσ=λ , as usual.  Recall that );ln,(lnln β−=ε KLgY .   
 Then, the log-likelihood function can be written as follows [Fan, Li and 
Weersink (1996)]:   
  nnYl
n
i
i
n
i
i ∑∑
==
εσ−

 


σ
λεΦ−+σ−


π=βσλ 1
2
2
1 2
11lnln2ln
2
),,(lnln … (6) 
where n is the number of pooled observations.  The individual estimates of technical 
inefficiency can be obtained by the conditional expectation of iu  given iε :   
[ ] ( )( )   uE iiiii 


σ
λε−σλεΦ−
σλεφ
λ+
σλ=ε
11 2
 … … … (7) 
The technical efficiency (TE) is defined as minus the exponential of the conditional 
inefficiency:   
[ ] uETE iii ε−= )exp(  … … … … … (8) 
… … … … … (3) 
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4.  ESTIMATION RESULTS 
For purposes of reference, I perform the standard ordinary least squares (OLS) 
estimation as well as the SFA.  Table 2 shows both estimates.  First of all, according 
to the Ramsey RESET test, the Cobb-Douglas specification given in Equation (2) is 
not acceptable; the hypothesis that there is no omitted variable can be rejected in the 
first column OLS model.  On the other hand, the same hypothesis cannot be rejected 
in the case of Column 3, which follows the flexible translog specification given in 
Equation (3).  Therefore, I can concentrate on analysing the estimation results of the 
translog production function.   
In Table 3, I present a main finding of this paper, which is about the 
elasticity of output with respect to each production factor, evaluated at the mean 
values.  It is clear that labour is productive in a concave fashion, but capital may 
or may not be productive.  Based on the SFA coefficients, a 1 percent increase in 
employees results in a 0.8 percent increase in performing loans.  Although a 
serious concern in the Pakistani banking industry is that employees are utilised 
in excess and are idle, the evidence does not indicate such a case.  This evidence 
is plausible, when taking into consideration the fact that the Pakistani banking 
industry remains at the initial stage of financial development and continues to be 
a labour-intensive industry.   
Table 2 
Estimation Results of SFA and OLS 
 OLS SFA OLS SFA 
lnL 0.33 
(0.62) 
–0.13 
(0.0001) 
33.47 
(28.15) 
31.59 
(1.29) 
lnK 0.23 
(0.49) 
0.59 
(0.0001) 
–26.32 
(17.86) 
–22.99 
(1.94) 
(1/2) lnL lnL   –7.87 
(6.17) 
–7.23 
(0.41) 
(1/2) lnK lnK   –4.60 
(3.65) 
–3.93 
(0.15) 
lnL lnK   6.10 
(4.43) 
5.34 
(0.35) 
Cons 6.21 
(2.46) 
8.63 –60.86 
(68.45) 
–60.13 
Lambda  3.7E+06 
(0.119) 
 1.5E+04 
(0.083) 
Sigma Square  0.705 
(0.199) 
 0.348 
(0.098) 
Obs. 25 25 25 25 
Log Likelihood  –13.765  –4.935 
R-squared 0.735  0.872  
RESET Test     
F-statistics 5.98  0.29  
The dependent variable is the logarithm of the performing loan amount. Note that the (White 
heteroscedasticity) standard errors are shown in parentheses (for OLS estimation). 
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Table 3 
Estimated Product Elasticities 
 Translog 
 OLS SFA 
∂Y L 1.645 0.819*** 
∂L Y (1.153) (0.165) 
∂Y K –0.868 –0.191 
∂K Y (1.169) (0.169) 
***: 1 percent significance level. 
The elasticity of output with respect to each production factor with the mean evaluation is indicated. The 
standard errors are shown in parentheses. 
 
It is noteworthy that there exists inefficient labour use on the bank-level, even 
though labour is generally productive.  For example, the output elasticities associated 
with labour are negative for HBL and others, as shown in Table 4.10   
Contrary to this, the effect of extending branch network is not different from 
zero and may be even negative.  This means that banks are severely suffering from 
over-branching and they should restructure their over-extended branches more 
aggressively, particularly in the rural areas.11  In other words, the targeted banks have 
mainly responded to the structural adjustment programmes by staff retrenchment 
(through the Golden Handshake Scheme), rather than branch closing.   
 
Table 4 
Estimated Bank-level Product Elasticities to Labour 
(∂Y/∂L)(L/Y) HBL UBL NBP IDBP NDFC 
1997-12 70.957 
(3.897) 
0.918 
(0.073) 
–0.318 
(0.148 
–3.364 
(0.556) 
3.909 
(0.091) 
1998-06 –1005 
(0.177) 
0.179 
(0.118) 
0.473 
(0.102) 
2.053 
(0.234) 
3.536 
(0.112) 
1998-12 –0.991 
(0.178) 
–4.711 
(0.453) 
0.483 
(0.090) 
2.095 
(0.231) 
3.961 
(0.088) 
1999-06 –1.042 
(0.181) 
1.421 
(0.049) 
0.751 
(0.086) 
2.095 
(0.231) 
3.961 
(0.088) 
2000-03 –1.103 
(0.185) 
1.318 
(0.057) 
0.915 
(0.077) 
2.222 
(0.224) 
3.909 
(0.091) 
The standard errors are shown in parentheses. 
 
10The ratio of overuse of labour in the Swedish banking industry, calculated by Battese, Heshmati, 
and Hjalmarsson (1998), is on average 12 percent.   
11This finding of banks’ over-branching does not seem to be unique for Pakistan but is common 
for many countries [e.g., Berger, Leusner, and Mingo (1997)].   
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In Table 5, I calculate bank-specific technical efficiency given in Equation (8) 
and depict the estimated efficiency in Figure 4.  Significantly, the effects of the 
structural adjustment programmes (starting from 1997) on the banking efficiency 
vary across banks.  It is shown that Habib Bank Limited (HBL) and National Bank 
of Pakistan (NBP) were improving the technical efficiency over the period, while the 
technical inefficiency of the other banks tends to be increasing or fluctuating.  The 
efficiency of Industrial Development Bank of Pakistan (IDBP) was relatively high  
 
Table 5 
Estimated Technical Efficiency 
 HBL UBL NBP IDBP NDFC Average 
1997-12 0.7565 0.3978 0.5505 0.9998 0.9999 0.7409 
1998-06 0.7417 0.1869 0.8829 0.8675 0.9390 0.7236 
1998-12 0.7829 0.8345 0.9021 0.9373 0.4984 0.7910 
1999-06 0.9373 0.3037 0.9999 0.9090 0.9300 0.8160 
2000-03 0.9998 0.3802 0.9464 0.8816 0.2965 0.7009 
Average 0.8436 0.4206 0.8563 0.9190 0.7328 0.7545 
 
Fig. 4. Estimated Technical Efficiency. 
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but slightly declining.  The United Bank Limited (UBL) and National Development 
Finance Corporation (NDFC) in general deteriorated in efficiency with a large 
fluctuation.  The reason for some predictions significantly departing from the 
estimated frontier is that although non-performing loans may pop up at the time of 
re-evaluating bank assets, the increase or decrease in labour and capital is gradual.  
The average efficiency for IDBP is the highest, followed by HBL and NBP.  The 
efficiency level for UBL is the lowest and is not half that of the best-practising bank, 
IDBP.  This large efficiency difference is not exaggerated and is consistent with the 
previous work, e.g., Adams, Berger, and Sickles (1999).12  At the latest reference 
point, HBL is the most efficient bank.   
The differential in technical efficiencies ranges from 43.9 percent to 75.2 
percent and seems to have been increasing after 1999, implying that there appear to 
be more striking differences between banks that are undergoing internal restructuring 
and banks that are failing to do so.  The dichotomy is caused by the difference in the 
initial conditions of individual banks and their effort levels in restructuring their 
internal organisations during the reform period.   
On the above estimation results, there are several limitations.  First of all, the 
sample size is small, and thus the results may not be efficient.  This results from data 
non-availability; more data would lessen the estimation inefficiency.  With regard to 
this point, the bootstrap estimates shown in Table 6 may provide a part of the 
answer; although the standard errors are large due to the nature of the SFA locally 
maximising the likelihood function, the coefficients are similar to the baseline 
estimates in Table 2.   
Secondly, there are alternative inputs and outputs of the banking industry, 
as I have mentioned.  In addition, they may vary across banks.  Related to this 
point, in the above argument, I implicitly assume a single common production 
function for all banks. 13   However, the production frontier may be different 
among banks, since banks usually differentiate their financial services and 
provide vertically different services to different types of firms and consumers.  
Some finance large manufacturers at a low interest rate, while others provide 
only small business loans at a relatively high interest rate.  If this is the case, the 
labour (or branch) productivity may take different forms bank by bank.  
Nevertheless, the five banks sampled in the current paper seem to engage in 
similar financial services.   
 
12Their estimation indicates that the relative technical efficiency in the U.S. banking industry is 
about 53 percent, relative to the best-efficient production experience.   
13The State Bank of Pakistan mentioned that during the period, the production function might be 
significantly shifted by political shocks, e.g., the detonation of a nuclear device in May 1998 resulting in 
the frozen foreign currency deposits, and the military takeover in October 1999.  Moreover, the estimation 
results should be adjusted by seasonal factors and other institutional schemes, such as the export finance 
scheme.  Nevertheless, the given data is not sufficient to account for these issues.   
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Table 6 
Bootstrap Estimation 
 OLS SFA 
lnL 27.19 
(66.50) 
51.43 
(63.32) 
lnK –22.01 
(53.63) 
–37.84 
(50.78) 
(1/2) lnL lnL –6.38 
(17.83) 
–12.16 
(16.80) 
(1/2) lnK lnK –3.61 
(12.68) 
–7.33 
(11.81) 
lnL lnK 4.96 
(14.90) 
9.30 
(13.96) 
Cons –46.54 
(132.01) 
–102.30 
(127.14) 
Obs. 25 25 
Repetition 1000 1000 
The dependent variable is the logarithm of the performing loan amount. The standard errors are shown in 
parentheses. 
 
Another justification in economics against the single production frontier 
assumption is that a hull frontier in the long-run exists, even if firms’ adopted 
technologies are heterogeneous.   
Finally, the most serious limitation of this paper is this: all the estimation 
results are relative values within the Pakistani state-owned banking industry.  If all 
the banks are equally inefficient, the measured efficiency might be over-estimated.  
Thus, the estimation results should be interpreted more carefully; some Pakistani 
banks are more efficient than others, and all Pakistani banks might operate far below 
the standard production frontier in the world.   
 
5.  CONCLUSION 
In this paper, I examine the change in technical (in)efficiency of the Pakistani 
banking industry, by estimating a stochastic production frontier.  As the banking 
industry is one of the most inefficient sectors in Pakistan, the government has 
undertaken the restructuring and preparation for privatisation of the major state-
owned banks since the late 1990s.  The main goal is to improve the efficiency in 
financial markets through separating ownership and management, and to strengthen 
the accountability and monitoring mechanisms.  Since it is well-known that financial 
development is positively correlated to economic growth, the international and 
bilateral organisations have supported the Pakistani government’s reform efforts by 
providing the structural adjustment programme loans.   
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By using the stochastic frontier analysis, I found that employees are 
significantly productive in a statistical sense, but banks suffer from over-branching.  
Thus, a serious concern that the banks are overstaffed and the employees are too 
often idle, in the Pakistani banking industry may not be well-supported by the 
evidence.  However, banks should step up branch retrenchment further.  This 
positive productivity of labour input in part reflects the fact that the Pakistani 
banking industry remains quite labour-intensive.   
Based on the SFA estimates, it is also shown that HBL and NBP are 
improving the technical efficiency over the reform period, while the technical 
efficiency of UBL and NDFC is ambiguous.  Thus, the efficiency performance of 
the former banks, after the structural adjustment programmes, is in marked 
contrast to that of the latter; some banks are responding to the structural reform, 
others not.     
A main policy implication to be derived from the estimation results is that the 
Pakistani government encourage relatively inefficient banks to engage more 
aggressively in restructuring their internal organisations and establishing an efficient 
corporate structure.  The possible way to efficient production, of which the 
effectiveness is directly uncovered in this paper, is the retrenchment of staff and 
closing down of extra branches, as intended by the programmes.  Branch 
retrenchment, particularly, must have a crucial effect.  In addition, there exist other 
ways for banks to improve efficiency; they can provide job training for their 
employees to become more skilled in terms of financial knowledge.  Banks are able 
to replace unskilled labour with information/technological systems, and skilled 
labour with advanced knowledge for operating them.  They can also build up more 
effective internal incentive schemes for employees to improve their morale and 
encourage them to work harder, even without managerial monitoring.   
Since the existing over-employment of the Pakistani state-owned banks partly 
results from the governmental employment measures, the strategies aiming at 
enhancing the existing labour abilities might be more effective in banks’ progressive 
restructuring, rather than the simple retrenchment of staff.  Of course, since new 
internal training and incentive systems are difficult to introduce, one key reform is 
the replacement of top management by outsiders with sufficient experience and 
advanced knowledge, which constitutes the World Bank-assisted programmes.   
One remaining important issue is that the evidence in this paper does not 
show that such measures imply the absolute efficiency improvement in the Pakistani 
banking industry.  It is still possible that all the Pakistani banks would be operating 
inefficiently, compared to the average of the international efficiency level.  Thus, the 
Pakistani government might have to continue restructuring the entire banking 
industry, and engage in making overall financial development conducive to stable 
economic growth and poverty reduction.   
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To follow this point, richer data in future investigation would allow for 
estimating a production frontier more efficiently, providing for more specific policy 
implications.  If detailed data of the financial and managerial structures, particularly 
including foreign banks in Pakistan, are available, this would show whether domestic 
state-owned banks operated less efficiently than the international standard level, and 
if so, what caused domestic bank inefficiency. Then, more concrete restructuring 
plans could be provided for the Pakistani banks.  
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